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In the past few years, publicized privacy violations
1
 have regularly 
spawned class action lawsuits in the United States,
2
 even when the 
company made a good faith mistake and no victim suffered any 
quantifiable harm. Privacy advocates often cheer these lawsuits because 
they generally favor vigorous enforcement of privacy violations, but this 
essay encourages privacy advocates to reconsider their support for 
privacy class action litigation. By its nature, class action litigation uses 
 
 *   Associate Professor and Director, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University 
School of Law. http://www.ericgoldman.org.  egoldman@gmail.com. In June 2012, the Fraley 
v. Facebook preliminary settlement named the High Tech Law Institute as a proposed recipient 
of cy pres funds. See http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1091&context=historical. This essay was written in conjunction with the Silicon 
Flatirons “The Economics of Privacy” Symposium at the University of Colorado Law School 
on December 2, 2011. Thanks to Ryan Calo, Colleen Chien, Michael Page, Peter Swire and the 
participants in the Second Annual Internet Law Works-in-Progress event at New York Law 
School and a faculty workshop at University of Akron School of Law for helpful comments. 
 1.  SCU’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics received $500,000 of cy pres money 
from the Google Buzz settlement. In re Google Buzz Privacy Litigation at 6, No. C 10-00672 
JW (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?f 
Name=53e758fe-3dc9-4c01-a93a-99361822dd32.pdf.   Independently, SCU’s High Tech Law 
Institute submitted an unsuccessful request for an allocation of those funds. Although lawsuits 
over data security breaches raise similar issues as online privacy lawsuits, this essay focuses 
on the latter. 
 2.  This essay focuses exclusively on the United States, in part because of its 
comparatively unusual rules for class action litigation.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045909
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tactics that privacy advocates disavow. Thus, using class action litigation 
to remediate privacy violations proves to be unintentionally ironic. 
I. THE IRONIC ATTRIBUTES OF PRIVACY CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
Class action lawsuits create numerous well-known problems.
3
 This 
section will enumerate some of those problems, and then show how, in 
the context of privacy violation enforcements,
4
 they create ironic 
outcomes for privacy advocates. 
A. Class Actions Typically Are Opt-Out 
Most privacy advocates prefer business practices that require 
consumers to “opt-in” rather than “opt-out,”5 i.e., consumers must 
affirmatively grant permission to a business’ collection or use of their 
data rather than take action to prevent such collection or use. From the 
perspective of privacy advocates, opt-outs misinterpret consumers’ 
silence as consent,
6
 and they make consumers act to preserve the status 
quo—which, due to consumer acquiescence to default settings, means 
that consumer opt-out rates are low.
7
 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, The Shaky Basis for Class Actions, FORBES, Feb. 8, 2010, at 
20, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/opinions-law-constitution-courts-
ideas-opinions.html  (discussing Prof. Martin Redish’s criticisms); Christopher R. Leslie, The 
Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 71 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and 
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 401-505 (2000).  
 4.  For a general discussion about privacy class action lawsuits, see generally Andrew 
B. Serwin, Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of Privacy Litigation, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 943-62 (2009) (discussing the basic legal 
doctrines applicable to privacy class action lawsuits). 
 5.  See, e.g., David Goldman, I Always Feel Like Someone Is Watching Me: A 
Technological Solution for Online Privacy, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 353, 379 (2006); 
Dennis W.K. Khong, An Economic Analysis of Spam Law, 1 ERASMUS L. & ECON. REV. 23, 
41 (2004), available at http://www.eler.org/archive/2004/eler-2004-1-23-khong.pdf; Paul M. 
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2100 (2004); Mike 
Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from 
Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1498-1500 
(2001); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of 
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1101 (1999) (“those who do not value privacy 
are likely to prefer an opt-out system, while privacy advocates can be expected to favor an opt-
in system”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 5, at 1498 (“An opt-out system places a cumbersome 
burden on consumers to inform a company that they do not want personal information shared, 
which they reasonably expect should remain confidential, when the burden should rest with the 
company to obtain consumers' consent before disclosing highly personal information”); 
Sovern, supra note 5, at 1101-03; Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 87, 116 (2001) (“privacy advocates argue that opt-out approaches put too much of a 
burden on consumers to protect their privacy”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Matthew Creamer, Despite Digital Privacy Uproar, Consumers Are Not 
Opting Out, ADVER. AGE, May 30, 2011, at 4, available at 
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Yet, class action lawsuits are typically opt-out, not opt-in, with 
those same downsides. Typically, if the class is certified, class members 
are automatically bound by the lawsuit’s outcome unless they opt-out.8 
Thus, just like opt-outs in the commercial setting, consumers must 
affirmatively act if they do not agree with the lawsuit, and like 
commercial opt-outs, the class action mechanism treats silence as 
consent.
9
 
Furthermore, empirically, consumers rarely opt-out of class action 
lawsuits.
10
 Indeed, opt-out rates for class actions are often substantially 
lower than privacy opt-out rates in commercial settings. As one study 
found: 
Opt-outs from class participation and objections to class action 
resolutions are rare: on average, less than 1 percent of class members 
opt-out and about 1 percent of class members object to class-wide 
settlements . . . . The opt-out rate for thirty-nine consumer class 
action cases is less than 0.2 percent.
11
 
Thus, privacy advocates should dislike the opt-out architecture of 
class action litigation just like they dislike it in commercial settings. 
B. Consumers Lack Meaningful Notice or Choice About Class 
Action Lawsuits 
Notice and choice are foundational principles of consumer 
privacy,
12
 but class action procedures do a poor job of providing 
consumers with notice or choice.
13
 
 
http://adage.com/article/digital/digital-privacy-uproar-consumers-opting/227828/ (consumers 
clicked on behavioral ad targeting icon only 0.002% of the time, and only 10% of the 
consumers who clicked through then opted-out); W.A. Lee, Opt-Out Notices Give No One A 
Thrill, AM. BANKER, July 10, 2001, at 1 (“5% opt-out rate . . . has been circulating as the 
unofficial industry figure” for Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act opt-outs).  
 8.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Depending on the timing, class members may have an 
additional right to opt-out of any settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4). 
 9.  See Leslie, supra note 3. 
 10.  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1533-34 
(2004) (calling opt-outs and objections “extremely uncommon” and the rates “trivially small”). 
See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 20 (2005), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClassGde.pdf/$file/ClassGde.pdf (“The typical class 
action settlement notice will most likely yield an apathetic response, and few objectors or opt-
outs.”). 
 11.  Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 1532. 
 12.  See, e.g., Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Jul. 16, 2012). 
 13.  See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out 
of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002) (discussing the due process challenges 
of class adjudication); Leslie, supra note 3 (explaining why consumers’ lack of objection to 
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Inadequate Notice. Commercial privacy policies are routinely 
criticized for being unreadable and incomprehensible.
14
 Yet, disclosures 
about class action lawsuits garner the exact same criticisms.
15
 So, just as 
we doubt consumers understand their privacy choices in commercial 
settings, we should doubt that consumers understand their choices about 
the litigation. 
Of course, that assumes consumers get notice of the class action 
lawsuit at all. Yet, it may be difficult or impossible to provide 
individualized notice to all—or even some—privacy class members 
because no one knows their exact identity (such as in the cookie cases). 
In those circumstances, inevitably, some consumers’ legal rights will be 
affected without their knowledge.
16
 
Even when it is possible to reach class members individually, some 
class members may view the use of their contact information to provide 
an unrequested (and inscrutable) notice of the litigation as another 
privacy invasion.
17
 
Lack of Choice. Consumers often lack any meaningful choice when 
presented with privacy opt-outs in commercial settings. If the consumers 
choose to opt-out, the business may simply provide them fewer, or less 
functional, services, and consumers who refuse to provide any 
information at all may lack meaningful competitive alternatives that will 
 
class settlements does not signal their true views about the settlement). 
 14.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICY MARKERS iii (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (“the notice-and-choice 
model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers 
typically do not read”) (hereinafter “FTC Protecting”); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie F. 
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J. OF L. & POLICY FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 543 
(2009); FELICIA WILLIAMS, INTERNET PRIVACY POLICIES: A COMPOSITE INDEX FOR 
MEASURING COMPLIANCE TO THE FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf.  
 15.  “Traditional notices are often hard to read and are uninviting.” Todd B. Hilsee et al., 
Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action 
Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1359, 1381 (2005). To remediate this problem, Congress amended Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) in 2003 to require that class action notices be written in “plain, easily 
understood language.” It is not clear this goal is being achieved. See, e.g., Shannon R. 
Wheatman & Terri R. LeClercq, Majority of Class Action Publication Notices Fail to Satisfy 
Rule 23 Requirements, 30 REV. LITIG. 53 (2010); Aashish Y. Desai, Confirmation Class, L.A. 
LAW., July-Aug. 2008, at 31 (“Factual uncertainty, legal complexity, and the complications of 
litigation make it increasingly difficult for practitioners to comply with this requirement—and 
trial courts, for the most part, are not demanding compliance. Thus, class notice, particularly in 
state court, tends to be overly legalistic and practically incomprehensible to members of the 
general public.”). 
 16.  Cf. George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the 
Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258 (1996) (discussing the interplay 
between notice to class members and Due Process requirements). 
        17.   See Jeff Kosseff, Note, The Elusive Value: Protecting Privacy During Class Action 
Discovery, 97 GEO. L.J. 289 (2008). 
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do business with them on a more private basis. 
Similarly, consumers who opt-out of class action lawsuits often lack 
viable alternatives.
18
  Opting-out typically preserves the consumer’s right 
to bring an individual lawsuit, but that option is not meaningful to most 
consumers.
19
 An individual lawsuit can be expensive—in many cases, 
costing more than the maximum possible financial relief available to a 
successful litigant (sometimes called “negative value” lawsuits)—and 
pursuing the suit may require time and expertise that the consumer does 
not have. Thus, even if consumers understand their rights to opt-out of 
the class, it is rarely an attractive option. 
Additionally, even consumers who opt-out of the class may be 
affected by the lawsuit’s outcome. First, while the consumer could 
theoretically obtain non-monetary relief that differs from the non-
monetary relief obtained by the class action lawsuit, subsequent judges 
will be reluctant to order any conflicting relief. Thus, the class action’s 
resolution imposes a de facto limit on the remedies available to class 
members who opt-out and pursue their own lawsuits. 
Second, to the extent the class action leads to an order or settlement 
requiring behavioral changes by the defendant, such as changed data 
management practices, the opting-out consumer will be subject to those 
changes as well.
20
 
Third, if the defendant must make payments that are not covered by 
insurance, the opting-out class member bears any increased fees the 
business imposes on consumers.
21
 Or, if the payment is financially 
ruinous to the defendant, the opting-out class member loses the service 
entirely. 
 
 18.  Opt-out can occur in a couple of different ways. Class members can opt-out of the 
lawsuit entirely. If the lawsuit settles, the class member may be given a second opt-out 
opportunity. Or, in the case of settlements, class members can remain in the class and object to 
the settlement terms, although doing so is typically futile. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 97-101. 
This essay focuses only on the first opt-out option, but the analysis largely applies equally to a 
settlement opt-out or an objection to the settlement. 
 19.  See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Posner, J.) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but 
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“‘The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for 
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.’” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); Leslie, supra note 3, at 97-101; Adam S. 
Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1134-55 (2010). 
 20.  This could apply even if the opting-out consumer has terminated his/her business 
relationship with the defendant, e.g., if the defendant changes its practices for data the 
defendant has legitimately retained about the departed consumer. 
 21.  Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The FTC and Class Actions, 
at the Class Action Litigation Summit (June 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/classactionsummit.shtm. 
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C. Consumers Lack Autonomy Over the Lawsuit 
Privacy advocates are often concerned about how privacy violations 
hinder individual autonomy.
22
 Yet, by its nature, class action litigation 
strips class members of their autonomy. Class members typically do not 
choose the lawyers purportedly advancing their interests.
23
 Class counsel 
is effectively self-appointed
24
 until the judge appoints counsel.
25
 
Furthermore, the lawyers, not the class members, drive all of the key 
decisions in the litigation.
26
 As the maxim goes, “class counsel controls 
the litigation.”27 Thus, to the extent litigation over privacy violations is 
designed to vindicate consumer autonomy, the procedure 
counterproductively undermines that goal. 
D. Class Action Lawyers Maximize Their Own Financial 
Interests, Not the Class’ Interests 
Privacy advocates often object to businesses unfairly profiting from 
consumers’ private data.28 Often, privacy advocates see privacy as a 
“zero-sum” game, where businesses win (via profits) by making 
consumers lose (via privacy violations). Yet, privacy class counsel and 
class members may unexpectedly be in a “zero-sum” relationship as 
well. Just like privacy-invading companies, class action lawyers often 
advance their own financial interests at the expense of the class 
members’ interests.29 
For example, class counsel might pursue settlements that maximize 
their payout, even if the settlement does not provide any financial relief 
to the class.
30
 Indeed, we have seen numerous privacy lawsuit 
 
 22.  See, e.g., James S. Taylor, Privacy and Autonomy: A Reappraisal, 40, S. J. 
PHILOSOPHY 587, 587, 601 n.1 (2002) (“it has been widely held in both the legal and the 
philosophical literature that a violation of one's privacy will necessarily also undermine one's 
autonomy . . . The claim that a violation of one's privacy will also serve to undermine one’s 
autonomy is repeated almost ad nauseum in the literature on privacy.”). 
 23.  See Leslie, supra note 3, at 76. Typically, class counsel picks the named class 
representatives. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class 
Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 196 (1990). 
 24.  Leary, supra note 21.   
 25.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 26.  As Prof. Leslie points out, the collective action problem motivating class 
adjudication means that typically no one, not even the named representatives, supervises or 
manages class counsel. Leslie, supra note 3, at 80-81. 
 27.  Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 1533. 
 28.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5.  
 29.  Leary, supra note 21; Leslie, supra note 3, at 77 (“Whereas the interests of the class 
and its attorneys may diverge, class counsel and defendants may have goals that can be 
aligned, even if they are seemingly at odds.”).  
 30.  See, e.g., Graybeal v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D.D.C. 1973) (“In 
any class action there is always the temptation for the attorney for the class to recommend 
settlement on terms less favorable to his clients because a large fee is part of the bargain.”); 
Leslie, supra note 3. 
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settlements that have provided minimal or zero financial relief for class 
members,
31
 even though the lawyers took substantial payments for 
themselves.
32
 A few examples (not an exhaustive list!) of recent online 
privacy lawsuits where class members got de minimis or no cash, unlike 
their lawyers: 
Facebook Beacon. Facebook launched a service where third party 
websites reported back information about Facebook users’ activities, and 
Facebook displayed that information in users’ newsfeeds without the 
users’ explicit permission. Facebook settled the resulting lawsuits for 
$9.5 million,
33
 of which over $2.3 million went to the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers
34
 and about $25,000 went to class representatives. The remaining 
funds are slated for a new privacy foundation. 
Google Buzz. Google launched a new social network, Google Buzz, 
which disclosed private information from users’ Gmail accounts. Google 
settled the resulting lawsuits for $8.5 million,
35
 of which the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers could claim up to 30% (over $2.5 million) and class 
representatives got up to $2,500 each.
36
 The remaining funds went to 
consumer education and privacy organizations.
37
 
NebuAd. NebuAd provided behavioral advertising technology to 
Internet access providers which allegedly violated various privacy laws. 
 
 31.  Shortly, I will address the argument that cy pres funds deliver value to class 
members.  
 32.  C.f. Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986461 (Feb. 19, 2012) (In data breach 
litigation settlements, the “mean value of settlements awarded to plaintiffs was about $2,500 
per plaintiff (min=$500, max=$15,000, n=19) with most awards being a nominal amount of 
around $500 and often awarded to named plaintiffs only. Attorney fees, on the other hand, 
were substantially larger, with a mean sum of $1.2M (min=$8,000, max=$6.5M, n=15)). We 
have not seen many recent “coupon” settlements to privacy class action lawsuits, but due to 
low redemption rates, coupons typically provide consumers with little financial relief as well. 
See, e.g., Thomas A. Dickerson & Brenda V. Mechmann, Consumer Class Actions and 
Coupon Settlements: Are Consumers Being Shortchanged?, 12 ADVANCING THE CONSUMER 
INTEREST 2 (2000), available at http://www.classactionlitigation.com/library/dcoupon.html. 
Congress recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1712 to curb some abuses of coupon settlements. 
 33.  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Approving Settlement at 7, Lane v. 
Facebook, No. C 08-3845 RS (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28530843/Lane-v-Facebook-N-D-Cal-Order-Approving-
Settlement. 
 34.  Order Re Attorney Fees at 4, Lane v. Facebook, No. C 08-3845 RS (N.D. Cal. May 
24, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/31994873/Lane-v-Facebook-N-D-Cal-
Order-re-Attorneys-Fees. 
 35.  Settlement Agreement at 6, In re Google Buzz User Privacy Litigation, No. 5:10-
CV-00672-JW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/3711 
5894/Google-Buzz-Settlement-Agreement.  
 36.  Wendy Davis, Google Settle Buzz Class-Action Privacy Suit, MEDIAPOST (Sep. 7, 
2010 5:05 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/135325/.   
 37.  Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement in the U.S. District 
Court at 3, Valentine, et al. v. NebuAd, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-05113 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2011), 
available at http://www.nebuadsettlement.com/Documents/NAV0001/NAV_NOT.pdf.  
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NebuAd settled the resulting lawsuits for $2.4 million, of which up to 
$800,000 went to the plaintiffs’ lawyers and seven class representatives 
got between $1,000 and $5,000.
38
 The remaining funds went to various 
privacy organizations.
39
 
Overall, the financial payoffs of class action litigation can lead to 
undesirable strategic behavior. For example, if multiple class action 
cases are filed and are not consolidated, settlement of one lawsuit moots 
the others—meaning the settling lawyers get paid and the other lawyers 
get zilch. This enables the defendant to conduct a “reverse auction,”40 
where the lawyers compete with each other to settle at a cheaper price to 
the defendant because the lowest-bidding lawyer will be the only lawyer 
to get paid (the auction has an implicit minimum price: the minimum 
amount the judge will approve). In a winner-takes-all situation like this, 
the interests of class members hardly take precedence. 
Even if the defendant does not conduct a reverse auction, it can still 
take advantage of the lawyers’ financial incentives to derogate the 
interests of class members. Instead of fighting the class action lawsuit, a 
defendant can choose to embrace it as an expeditious way to resolve 
questions about its practices. In this situation, for the price of the 
settlement, the defendant can eliminate all past legal liability and 
potentially obtain judicial approval for its current business practices 
across all consumers. Because the plaintiffs’ lawyers will get paid from 
the settlement, the lawyers representing the class may be pliable in their 
negotiations. Once a settlement is struck, both the defendant and the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have strong financial incentives to jointly persuade the 
judge to accept the deal. Effectively, then, a class action lawsuit can help 
the defendant and the plaintiffs’ lawyers collude with each other to 
advance their financial interests, with the judge (and any objecting class 
members) being the only line of defense to protect consumers’ interests. 
 
 38.  Wendy Davis, NebuAd Settles Lawsuit Over Behavioral Targeting Tests, 
MEDIAPOST (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:26 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/ 
155980/. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370 (1995). As Prof. Leslie summarizes:  
In extreme situations, the defendant who anticipates class action litigation 
will shop for class counsel to initiate litigation and then negotiate a 
sweetheart settlement with those plaintiffs’ attorneys. Even in an ongoing 
class lawsuit, the class counsel may fear standing up to a defendant who 
offers a sweetheart deal, lest that defendant solicit another class counsel 
to file a competing class action in another jurisdiction, settle the latter 
case immediately, and wipe out the first class action altogether, leaving 
the original class counsel on the hook for its costs and without any 
recovery at all. 
Leslie, supra note 3, at 80 (footnote omitted). 
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II. IMPLICATIONS 
Let us assume this essay is correct, and privacy class action 
litigation creates irony. Privacy advocates still might consider privacy 
class action litigation an acceptable tool, despite the irony, because the 
ends justify the means or the alternatives are not any better. 
Ends Justify the Means. Even if class action litigation is not an ideal 
way to advance consumer interests, privacy advocates could nevertheless 
decide that its virtues trump its disadvantages. Class action litigation 
remediates specific privacy violations on an ex post basis, especially 
when individual litigation is not cost-justified for any one affected 
consumer. Even if consumers do not get the cash, defendants may make 
behavioral changes that benefit consumers (voluntarily or through an 
injunction). And cy pres payouts are supposed to provide indirect 
benefits to consumers generally,
41
 although critics have strongly 
questioned this.
42
 
Furthermore, the specter of potential privacy class action litigation 
encourages companies to avoid privacy violations ex ante.
43
 Still, it is 
hard to isolate the ex ante effects of class actions compared with the ex 
ante effects of other enforcement mechanisms (such as government 
enforcement)
44
 and adverse consequences from negative publicity.
45
 
Finally, in theory, litigation payoffs motivate class action lawyers to 
research and discover privacy violations that otherwise would go 
undiscovered.
46
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However, these benefits do not come for free. Privacy class action 
litigation is redistributive. It often enriches only a small coterie of 
lawyers and cy pres recipients at the expense of everyone else: the 
defendants’ stockholders or insurance companies, employees and service 
providers terminated or not hired due to the lawsuit’s financial impact, 
and ultimately consumers—the class members who the lawyers are 
supposedly representing!—who pay more (or get worse services) 
because the litigation payoffs are not being invested in better services at 
lower prices. Worse, when privacy class action lawsuits fail in court—a 
startlingly frequent outcome
47—the defense costs harm class members 
without any countervailing benefits at all. 
So are the ex post and ex ante benefits of privacy class action 
lawsuits worth the costs imposed on the system plus the intrinsic ironies 
of class action litigation? There are not easy answers, but it is a question 
privacy advocates need to thoughtfully consider. 
While doing so, privacy advocates should recognize a further irony 
of the “ends justify means” rationale. After all, companies routinely use 
the same rhetoric to justify their activities, arguing that their privacy 
practices are in the consumers’ “best interest.” Do privacy advocates 
really want to embrace this sophistry? Especially for privacy advocates 
who believe privacy is a fundamental right, it seems like it should be a 
non-starter to embrace disavowed tactics to “protect” those fundamental 
rights. 
Enforcement Alternatives Are not Better. Even recognizing class 
action litigation’s defects, privacy advocates might still feel it is a better 
enforcement mechanism than the alternatives. The truth is that all 
privacy enforcement mechanisms have serious downsides. Competitor 
enforcements do not advance consumer interests directly, and many 
competitors may fear that their own practices are not clean. Certification 
bodies face their own conflicts-of-interest as enforcers; an enforcement 
action typically means the certifier is suing one of its paying customers.
48
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Government enforcers (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission, State 
Attorneys General and international Data Protection Agencies) usually 
face fewer conflicts-of-interest,
49
 but government agencies typically 
bring enforcement actions only in egregious situations or for its 
precedent value.
50
 
Implications. In the end, almost every ex post mechanism to enforce 
privacy violations is not completely satisfying to privacy advocates. This 
explains why the FTC is so anxious to get companies to make privacy-
savvy ex ante decisions.
51
 If privacy class action litigation actually gets 
businesses to make better ex ante privacy decisions than alternative 
enforcement mechanisms, perhaps the ends do justify the means. This is 
an empirical question that would benefit from additional research. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay identifies a quandary facing privacy advocates. So much 
privacy scholarship focuses on the substantive scope of privacy 
protection, but if enforcement will undercut the ideals encoded in the 
underlying privacy rights, perhaps privacy advocates are not making real 
progress towards their normative objectives. Additional research into 
optimal enforcement mechanisms for privacy violations may be a 
productive endeavor. 
  
 
Mr. Edelman To Do The Same …, REVENEWS (Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.revenews.com/ 
affiliate-marketing/truste-answers-the-challenge-and-asks-mr-edelman-to-do-the-same/; Tim 
Clark, Truste Clears Microsoft on Technicality, CNET (Mar. 22, 1999, 6:45 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-223374.html. 
 49.  But they are not free from conflicts-of-interest. For example, government decision-
makers exercising prosecutorial discretion may be more interested in maximizing their own 
career trajectory or personal reputation instead of advancing the public good. 
 50.  For a discussion of other challenges to government enforcement of privacy 
violations, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
877, 885-89 (2003). 
 51.  FTC Protecting, supra note 14. 
GOLDMAN_MSW_11.11.12_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2012  3:21 PM 
320 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol. 10 
 
